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Abstract 
This paper presents a quantum mechanical version of the piggy-bank cryptography protocol. The 
basic piggybank cryptography idea is to use two communications: one with the encrypted 
message, and the other regarding the encryption transformation which the receiver must decipher 
first. In the quantum mechanical version of the protocol, the encrypting unitary transformation 
information is sent separately but just deciphering it is not enough to break the system. The 
proposed quantum protocol consists of two stages. 
 
 
Introduction 
There exist at least two separate paradigm of the secure communication system from the 
perspective of the usage of keys: (i) the standard cryptographic scheme where the key is required 
at both ends (and the key can be symmetric or non-symmetric) [1], and (ii) where the key 
information is sent separately using a different communication in such a manner that its 
decipherment by the eavesdropper in itself does not break the communication (piggybank 
protocol of [2]). The piggybank paradigm breaks up the secret communication into two parts 
somewhat in the spirit of recursive hiding of secrets [3], the interlock protocol [4] and the 
ElGamal cipher [5], excepting that it considers the transformation in a more general setting. This 
potentially makes the task of the eavesdropper harder because she must break both the messages 
correctly in order to break the system. It also makes it possible to trade off the complexity of the 
two transformations in a manner that makes it suitable for use in some compute-capacity limited 
applications. 
 
Here we present a simplified implementation of the three-stage protocol [6] using the piggy-bank 
idea. This protocol has been implemented [7],[8]. The motivation is to reduce the number of 
stages of the protocol. The piggybank version of the protocol reduces to two stages which can be 
of value in several applications. 
The paper firstly describes the piggybank idea in a classical setting by means of an example. 
Then the quantum cryptographic protocol is presented. 
 
Background: The basic Piggy bank protocol 
The basic classical piggybank protocol [2] introduces an additional element in the 
communication process. Bob sends an empty locked piggy bank to Alice. When she receives it, 
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Alice deposits the secret into the box together with the decryption key of a coded letter. In 
addition, she prepares a letter to be sent separately. The piggy bank and the letter are sent back to 
Bob. 
 
The letter is required to authenticate the contents of the locked piggybank box. It cannot be in 
plain text because the content list itself is a secret. Bob opens the box, obtains the key and then 
unlocks the secret within the letter using the key. In this implementation of the piggybank 
protocol for data, Bob obtains secret message (S) and  key which is h(S). 
Step1. Bob starts with a random number R and the piggy bank transformation is represents by a 
one way transmission f(R)= modeR  n, where n is a composite number with factors known only 
to him; e is the publicly known encryption exponent. 
Step2. Bob sends f(R) to Alice who multiplies it with  hash function h(S) which is denoted as K. 
Alice sends nSRK e mod)( +  to Bob in one communication and f(K)= nK e mod in another 
communication. 
Step3. Bob uses his secret inverse transformation to first recover K and having found it he can 
recover S. 
Example 1: Let n=522617 and the public encrypting exponent is e=5 (with the secret decrypting 
algorithm being 416,861). Bob chooses random R=1201 and sends 12015 mod 522617= 169841 
to Alice.  
Alice’s random secrets are S=11925 hash function of S is h(S) i.e. K=5. Alice computes                     
169841 × 5 +11925 = 861130 and sends it and also 55 mod 522617 = 3125 to Bob. 
Bob uses his secret decryption exponent to recover K: 3125416861 mod 522617 = 5. Thus 
5×169841 + S=861130, from which he recovers S. 
 
Example 2.  Let n=124711 and the public encrypting exponent is e=3 (with the secret 
decrypting algorithm being 82667). Bob chooses random R=2101 and sends 21013 mod1 24711 
= 102786  to Alice. 
Alice’s random secrets are S=9278 hash function of S is h(S) i.e. K=8 Alice computes 
102786 × 8 + 9278 = 831566 and sends it and also 83 mod 124711 = 512 to Bob. 
Bob uses his secret decryption exponent to recover K: 51282667 mod1 24711 = 8. Thus 8×102786 
+ S = 831566, from which he recovers S. 
 
Assuming that this protocol uses a cryptographically strong random number generation 
algorithm, it makes it difficult for the eavesdropper to guess the value of R and break the public 
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encryption key e.  Apart from random number generation use of a complex hash function will 
also prevent the protocol from Man in the middle attack. Even if Eve tries to attack and gets hold 
of the secret message, Alice and Bob can introduce classical authentication resource say one-
time pad, which might be able to recognize the misinformation from Eve, if any. 
 
The Proposed Quantum Protocol 
Consider the arrangement of Figure 1 to transfer state Y from Alice to Bob. To transfer state Y 
from Alice to Bob the state Y is one of the two orthogonal states, such as 0  and 1 , or 
( )10
2
1
+  and ( )10
2
1
− , or 10 βα + and 10 βα −  The orthogonal states of Y 
represent 0 and 1 by prior mutual agreement of the parties. 
 
Alice and Bob apply secret transformations AU and BU  which are commutative, i.e 
ABBA UUUU = . An example for this would be )(θRU A =  and )(φRU B = , where 
𝑅(𝜃) = �𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃 −𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃
𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃
�   . In other words, rotations are limited to linear polarization. The 
sequence of operations in the protocol is as follows: 
 
Step 1.  
Bob applies the transformation BU on X, a random polarization state which is the cover state, 
and sends n qubits of it to Alice. 
 
Step 2. 
2.1 Alice applies AU  on the received n qubits to form   )(XUU BA  and sends them bank to Bob 
in one communication.  
2.2 Somewhat later she sends  )(YU A
+  in another communication in m qubits where Y is the 
secret message bit (m << n). 
 
Step 3.  
Bob applies +BU  on the received bunch of n cover qubits and then performs tomography to get 
the transformation AU and then he applies this transformation on the second received 
communication to get secret message bit Y. 
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 Figure 1. Piggybank protocol for quantum cryptography 
 
The transformations used by both Alice and Bob to send their qubits are secret (although Alice’s 
rotation is deciphered by Bob before he can obtain the value of the message bit Y). To retrieve 
secret message bit Y from )(YU A
+  it is necessary for Bob to calculate AU . It is possible only if 
they transmit multiple photons and calculate AU and then apply it to the inverse message to get 
Y. Here X is random information that remains known only to Bob. 
This protocol assumes that the eavesdropper cannot estimate the original polarizations [9]-[11] 
and, of course, due to the no-cloning theorem he cannot make multiple copies of the transmitted 
photons. If m =1, the system is provably secure. 
To consider the value of n, let the tomographic scheme used by Bob extract log2 n bits of 
information regarding the polarization angle or the transformation AU . If Bob is going to choose 
out of k discrete angles that are equally spaced then n = 2k.  
The eavesdropper will need n photons to determine the angle.  Therefore, the system would be 
safe as long as the number of photons being used is less than 2n. If Even siphons off too many 
photons, she would be detected. 
Y 
Bob 
Alice 
Bob 
Eve 
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Eve would need more then n photons to determine AU . Let us consider that Eve needs kn  
photons (where k>1) and Bob can send up to kn  photons.  
There is also an inverse relationship between n and m. If a large n is used, m should be small and 
vice versa.  
  
 
Figure 2: Inverse function between n and m for same error problem 
 
Table 1 discusses the Game theoretic view of the problem where Eve is involved in the system. 
The system is meant to be safe until the number of photons is less than 2n. The challenge will be 
to use the inverse relationship between n and m to force Eve into siphoning few photons which 
will keep the system safe. 
Table 1: Game theoretic view of the Problem 
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Conclusions 
This note has presented a provably secure variant of the three-stage protocol where only two 
stages are required. The proposed system has two parameters, m and n, which are the number of 
photons being used for the cover qubit and the message qubit respectively. This provides 
flexibility as far as the usage of the system is concerned. We have also discussed the game 
theoretic approach of the system to Eve. 
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